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March 2002
Premarital
Agreements and ERISA Benefits
Laura W. Morgan
More and more couples are turning to premarital agreements
to define their interests in property. Although the Family
Law Section of the American Bar Association states there are
no definitive figures, an article in the July 1999 issue of
Money Magazine stated that in 1990, the incidence
of couples using premarital agreements was 1%; in 1999, it
was 5%. The article’s author opined that reason for the
rise in the use of premarital agreements is that the rate
of divorce has risen, and consequently the rate of remarriage
has risen as well. Moreover, the median age of first marriage
has increased from 22.8 to 27.1 for men, and 20.3 to 24.8
for women. Because older persons tend to be more established
financially, they have turned to antenuptial agreements with
increasing frequency.
Generally, there is no public policy barring individuals
from waiving property rights in an antenuptial agreement.
In fact, many a court has stated that antenuptial agreements
dealing with property division upon divorce are to be encouraged
as a way of promoting marital harmony.
Nonetheless, there are certain rights that some courts have
held cannot be waived as a matter of public policy. For example,
some courts have held that a spouse cannot waive the right
to sue for divorce. Coggins v. Coggins, 601 So. 2d
109 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992). Some courts have held that a spouse
cannot waive the right to support during the marriage. E.g.,
Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. App. 4th
647, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1993); Blanton v. Blanton,
654 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. DCA 1995); Solomon v. Solomon,
224 A.D.2d 331, 637 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1996); Dimick v. Dimick,
112 Nev. 56, 915 P.2d 254 (1996); Boyer v. Boyer,
925 P.2d 82 (Okla. Ct. app. 1996). Another right that parties
cannot waive, not because of public policy, but because of
federal preemption, is the right a spouse has in a private
pension governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA). 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
As family law practitioners are painfully aware, ERISA contains
an anti-assignment clause that prevents pension owners from
transferring their pension rights to another person. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(3)(A). The only way for a domestic relations
court to assign pension benefits is by a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order (QDRO). 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A). See
Roth v. Roth, 201 Mich. App. 563, 506 N.W.2d 900
(1993) (containing general historical review of state court
authority to divide ERISA-regulated retirement benefits).
Federal law preemption of state law on ERISA rights is clear.
What is not so clear is whether private parties can waive
any and all ERISA rights by an antenuptial agreement. The
most recent case to discuss the federal preemption issue is
Hagwood
v. Newton, No. 01-1909 (U.S. Court of Appeals, 4th
Circuit, February 26, 2002)
First, the law is relatively clear that an antenuptial waiver
of survivor benefits under an ERISA-qualified plan
is ineffective. The surviving spouse’s entitlement to
an annuity cannot be waived unless the spouse consents to
the designation of an alternative beneficiary in writing and
the consent acknowledges the effect of the waiver and the
consent is witnessed by a notary public or plan representative.
29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(1), (2). No other document will do.
Thus, an antenuptial agreement, which is not signed by a spouse,
and is generally not witnessed by a notary public or plan
representative, is ineffective to waive survivor benefits.
National Automotive Dealers v. Arbeitman, 89 F.2d
496 (8th Cir. 1996); Callahan v. Hutsell, Callahan
& Buchino, 14 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 1993);
Pedro Enterprises v. Perdue, 998 F.2d 491 (7th
Cir. 1993); Howard v. Branham & Baker Coal Co.,
968 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1992); Hurwitz v. Sher,
982 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S.
912, 113 S. Ct. 2345 (1993); Nellis v. Boeing Co.,
1992 WL 122773 (D. Kan. 1992); Zinn v. Donaldson Co.,
799 F. Supp. 69 (D. Minn. 1992).
In the most recent case to discuss the issue, Hagwood
v. Newton, No. 01-1909 (U.S. Court of Appeals, 4th
Circuit, February 26, 2002), Toni Odom and Charles Newton
signed a “Premarital Agreement,” agreeing that the
property of each would remain separate after their marriage
and explicitly waiving any right to each other’s property.
Two years after Odom and Newton were married, Odom died. Her
estate and her father now seek to enforce the Premarital Agreement
against Newton’s spousal rights in Odom’s employee
stock plan and savings plan, conferred on Newton by §
205(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
as amended by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (“ERISA”),
29 U.S.C. § 1055(a). Because the Premarital Agreement
did not comport with ERISA’s formal requirements for
waiver of Newton’s spousal rights, the court concluded
that the agreement cannot be enforced to deny Newton’s
spousal rights in Odom’s benefit plans.
The court pointed to previous precedent as well:
In reaching our conclusion that premarital agreements
generally cannot fulfill the requirements of 29 U.S.C. §
1055(c), we join the unanimous view of other federal courts
that have considered the question. See, e.g.,
National Automobile Dealers & Assocs. Retirement Trust
v. Arbeitman, 89 F.3d 496, 502 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
that an agreement “signed before the marriage failed
to satisfy the waiver requirements of ERISA”); Hurwitz,
982 F.2d at 782 (holding that premarital agreements “do
not constitute effective waivers under ERISA”); Ford
Motor Co. v. Ross, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073-74 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (holding that “premarital agreement cannot
be used to circumvent ERISA’s spousal waiver requirements”);
Zinn v. Donaldson Co., 799 F. Supp. 69, 73 (D. Minn.
1992) (same); Nellis v. Boeing Co., No. 91-1011-K,
1992 WL 122773, *4 (D. Kan. May 8, 1992) (holding that a premarital
agreement was not valid waiver because it “was not signed
while [the wife] was a spouse with current vested rights in
the plans”). But see Estate of Hopkins, 574
N.E.2d 230 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that premarital agreement
was valid waiver under 29 U.S.C. § 1055 even though the
parties were not yet married).
As noted by the Hagwood court, one decision departs
from this rule. In In re Estate of Hopkins, 214 Ill.
App. 3d 427, 574 N.E.2d 230 (1991), the husband and wife executed
an antenuptial agreement in 1982, whereby the wife waived
any and all rights she had in the husband’s ERISA-qualified
pension, including survivor rights. The husband then died,
and the wife sought her survivor benefits, claiming her waiver
was ineffectual because it did not conform to 29 U.S.C. §
1055. The court disagreed, and held that “the specific
waiver requirements” of ERISA need not be complied with
in order for the waiver to be effective. See also
Fox Valley & Vicinity Construction Workers Pension
Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1990)
(upholding waiver of pension rights in property settlement
agreement that did not comply with ERISA’s waiver requirements).
Second, the law is not clear whether the parties can waive,
by an antenuptial agreement, other ERISA pension rights. For
example, in In re Marriage of Rahn, 914 P.2d 463
(Colo. Ct. App. 1995), the parties executed an antenuptial
agreement whereby they agreed that “all of the property
now owned or hereafter acquired by husband will remain his
sole and separate property throughout the marriage. Wife shall
not claim or acquire any interest in any of his property if
it increases in value during the marriage, jointly held property
being excepted.” The wife contended that the trial court
erred when it determined that she waived her spousal rights
to her husband’s ERISA-qualified pension plan. The husband
contended that the federal statutes and regulations address
the waiver of survivor benefits only, and are silent
as to other type of pension benefits under an ERISA-qualified
plan. Thus, the husband argued, the wife was free to waive
her rights in the husband’s pension other than survivor
benefits, and the antenuptial agreement was a valid waiver
of those rights. The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the
waiver of rights other than survivor benefits, reasoning that
ERISA provides the explicit requirements for a spouse’s
waiver of rights to the “qualified joint and survivor
annuity” and the “qualified pre-retirement survivor
annuity” in a qualified ERISA plan. Regulations interpreting
ERISA’s statutory authority specifically state:
An agreement entered into prior to marriage does
not satisfy the applicable requirements, even if the agreement
is executed within the applicable election period.
Thus, a waiver of a right to survivor benefits in an ERISA-qualified
plan in an antenuptial agreement is ineffective and the surviving
spouse is entitled to the survivor benefits even though others
are named as survivor beneficiaries with the plan administrator.
ERISA does NOT, however, preempt states dissolution of marriage
laws with respect to the waiver of other interests
in an ERISA-qualified retirement plan, despite the anti-alienation
provisions of ERISA. A valid waiver can be enforced through
a QDRO.
Other courts have agreed that ERISA’s preemption extends
only to survivor benefits and not to other ERISA benefits.
Fox Vally & Vicinity Construction Workers Pension
Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1990);
Moor-Jankowski v. Moor-Jankowski, 222 A.D.2d 422,
634 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1995). Thus, a party is free to waive ERISA
benefits other than survivor benefits by an antenuptial agreement.
A New Jersey case, Hawxzhurst v. Hawxzhurst, 318
N.J. Super. 72, 723 A.2d 58 (1998), found that the wife had
not waived her rights in her husband’s pension, and this
case should be contrasted with Rahm. In Hawxzhurst,
the parties signed an antenuptial agreement whereby the wife
would be entitled to 50% of the husband’s net worth in
the event of a divorce after a marriage of five years or longer.
The agreement also provided that each party shall keep and
retain sole ownership in property owned at the time of the
marriage, and each party waives any rights in that separate
property.
The husband argued that his IRA, 50% of which was awarded
to the wife under the terms of the antenuptial agreement,
was not subject to equitable distribution, because the wife
had waived any rights in it. Specifically, the husband’s
IRA was traceable to his ERISA-qualified pension at Bell Atlantic.
When he retired, he took a lump-sum distribution of his pension
and rolled it over into the IRA. It was undisputed that the
IRA was totally traceable to the husband’s pension and
had not been commingled with marital funds. The court held
that the antenuptial agreement simply did not apply to the
IRA, although it might have applied had the pension not been
rolled over, because the anti-alienation provision of ERISA
could not apply to the IRA even if the IRA funds were completely
traceable to the pension. “Benefits” are protected
by ERISA only while they are within the fiduciary responsibility
of the fund manager. Thus, the antenuptial agreement did not
operate to waive the wife’s rights in the IRA.
In contrast to Rahm and Hawxzhurst, some
courts have held that an antenuptial agreement cannot waive
any rights under an ERISA-qualified plan. For example,
in Richards v. Richards, 167 Misc. 2d 392, 640 N.Y.S.2d
709 (Sup. Ct. 1995), affirmed 648 N.Y.S.2d 589 (App.
Div. 1996), the parties executed an antenuptial agreement
prior to the marriage. Each party waived rights in the past
and future earnings of the other. The wife specifically waived
any claim to the husband’s present or future pension,
both in equitable distribution and as a survivor. Without
distinguishing between survivor rights and other types of
rights, the court held that “Federal law precludes giving
effect to a prenuptial waiver of spousal rights under ERISA.”
Practice Tip: Parties wishing to waive ERISA-qualified
pension rights in an antenuptial agreement would be well-advised
to include in the agreement a provision whereby after the
marriage, the spouse waiving the pension rights agrees to
execute any and all forms required to effect the waiver under
29 U.S.C. § 1055.
Option 1:
After the marriage, each party shall execute any
document necessary to effectuate the terms of this agreement.
More specifically, each party shall, upon request of the other
party and upon being provided with the necessary documents,
execute a waiver of rights in accordance with 29 U.S.C. §
1055.
Option 2:
It is further agreed and understood between the
parties that the written waivers as herein described shall
be executed by _____ subsequent to the marriage of the parties,
when ______ shall have achieved the status of spouse as required
under ERISA for such waivers to be valid and binding. Such
waiver shall be executed in conformance with 29 U.S.C. §
1055. Any waiver executed after the marriage in conformance
with this paragraph shall be deemed to be substantial compliance
with the requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 1055.
Cases
Branco
v. UCFW-Northern California Employers Joint Pension Plan,
No. 00-15884 (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, February 11, 2002): The court was called upon to
decide whether ERISA preempts a state law which allows a predeceased
spouse’s interest in her ex-husband’s pension plan
to pass to her heirs. The court concluded that based on Egelhoff,
ERISA preempts California community property laws.
Ex
Parte D.W. and J.C.W., No. 1001467 (Alabama Supreme
Court, February 8, 2002): The Mississippi Court of Appeals
held that the state’s grandparent visitation statute
which provides that a grandparent can obtain visitation with
a grandchild who was adopted by a family member if it is in
the child’s best interests, § 26-10A-30, was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court reversed. “It was the clear intent
of the Legislature in enacting § 26-10A-30 to give the
trial court the authority to grant post-adoption visitation
rights to the natural grandparents of the adoptee, when the
adoptee is adopted by a family member. The only reasonable
conclusion is that the Legislature intended to limit the rights
of the adopting parents by allowing the possibility of court-ordered
grandparent visitation over the objections of the adopting
parents. Any other conclusion would fail to give any effect
to § 26-10A-30, in violation of this Court’s duty
to harmonize the statutory provisions in order to give effect
to all parts of the statute. Under the facts of this case,
adopting parents, whose rights are exclusively dependent upon
statutory law, must be treated differently than natural parents.
The Court of Civil Appeals erred in failing to note this distinction
and, as a result, erroneously held that Troxel compelled
the reversal of the judgment of the trial court.”
Tennille
v. Tennille, No. 99-CV-1001 & 00-CV-924 (District
of Columbia Court of Appeals, February 14, 2002): The ex-husband
appealed from the entry of default judgment on a breach of
contract action where he agreed to pay his former wife a fixed
percent of his income in lieu of alimony. He also appealed
the denial of a motion for relief from that judgment after
he deliberately ignored the complaint after proper service
on him and also ignored discovery requests. The appellate
court affirmed, holding that even though he might have had
a meritorious defense, his deliberate disregard of the judicial
process warranted the default judgment.
Strother
v. Strother, No. 27149 (Idaho Court of Appeals,
February 8, 2002): The husband sent the wife a check, with
the notation that it was in full satisfaction of a court order.
After the wife cashed the check, the husband claimed accord
and satisfaction of his obligations under the parties’
separation agreement. The court disagreed, and held that his
notation of what the check satisfied was not plain and unambiguous.
Terwilliger
v. Terwilliger, No. 1999-SC-1064-DG (Kentucky
Supreme Court, February 7, 2002): Mr. Terwilliger drafted
the parties’ separation agreement, and urged the wife
to sign the agreement without consulting independent counsel.
In connection with the agreement, the husband represented
to the wife that his corporations were nearly bankrupt and
bleeding money, and that she needed to sign the agreement
as soon as possible to forestall the creditors. Guess what?
After she signed the agreement, the husband sold the corporation,
and he walked away with over $1.6 million, while she walked
away with about $23,350. The wife moved to reopen the divorce
based on fraud, and the husband argued that his misrepresentations
did not amount to fraud on the court. In reaching its decision
that the husband had committed fraud, the Kentucky court discussed
the “intrinsic/extrinsic” fraud distinction, and
held that the husband’s fraud was of such a nature as
to constitute a fraud on the court.
DeMatteo
v. DeMatteo, No. SJC-08614 (Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, February 8, 2002): The trial court held the
parties’ prenuptial agreement invalid as being unfair
and unreasonable both at the time it was executed and when
the husband sought its enforcement on commencing a divorce
action nearly eight years after the parties were married.
The husband appealed, and the SJC reversed, holding the evidence
did not warrant such a conclusion. After some negotiation,
including the wife rejecting a number of drafts, the agreement
provided that the wife would receive the marital home free
of encumbrance, yearly support of $35,000 until her death
or remarriage with an annual cost-of-living increase, an automobile,
and medical insurance until her death or remarriage. All property
jointly acquired during the marriage would be divided between
the parties in equal shares.Both attorneys were present when
the parties executed the agreement and the signing was recorded
on videotape. The recording shows the husband’s attorney
reciting the terms of the agreement and the parties communicating
their understanding of and consent to those terms. The parties
acknowledge they have received advice from counsel of their
choice, that they understand their rights in the absence of
the agreement, and that they each have read the other’s
financial disclosures. The court concluded, “Applying
the correct legal standard, we conclude that the judge’s
findings do not support a conclusion that the agreement was
not fair and reasonable when it was executed. Substantively,
the agreement provided that in the event of divorce the husband
would continue to provide for the wife’s support and
her health insurance until her death or remarriage; she would
also have housing (the marital home) and transportation. These
provisions do not strip the wife of her marital rights. In
fact, they leave her in a better economic position than she
had before the marriage.”
Roof
Depot, Inc. v. Ohman, No. C5-01-1112 (Minnesota
Court of Appeals, February 6, 2002): A provision in a marriage-dissolution
decree purporting to grant a lien on stock in a closely held
corporation does not supersede restrictions on pledging or
encumbering that stock when a proper notice appears on the
stock certificate and the underlying transfer-restriction
agreement applies to pledges and encumbrances whether voluntary
or involuntary and whether by operation of law or otherwise.
In
re Estate of Hodges, No. 2001-CA-00030-SCT (Mississippi
Supreme Court, February 14, 2002): The parties’ separation
agreement provided that the husband would pay the wife the
sum of $4,000.00 per month in periodic alimony. The agreement
also made provision for the maintenance of life insurance
by both parties. With regard to the life insurance, the agreement
provided the following: “Husband shall maintain his current
policy of life insurance with Wife listed as a name beneficiary
thereon for a sum not more than $164,000.00. Provided however,
Wife’s interest in the life insurance policy shall decrease
at the rate of $4,000.00 per month beginning July 1, 1997,
and a like amount each month thereafter so long as alimony
is paid by Husband.” The husband then died intestate.
At the time of his death, he had timely made alimony payments
to the wife totaling $92,000.00. The wife then presented herself
to AMA Provident Life Insurance Company as the beneficiary
of all $200,000.00 of the husband’s life insurance proceeds,
and she proceeded to retain the entire amount. Counsel for
the Estate made several requests for the Estate’s share
of the life insurance proceeds under the terms of the agreement.
The wife, however, refused to transmit the requested sum of
$128,000.00 to the Estate. The appellate court held, “In
reading the agreement as a whole and considering the intention
of the parties, we find that Joan and Jeff clearly contracted
for $164,000.00 of the life insurance proceeds to be maintained
to guarantee a limited amount of alimony to be paid to Joan
in the event of Jeff’s death. The amount was to be reduced
by each subsequent alimony payment made by Jeff. The instrument
undisputably manifested the parties’ intention to provide
a minimum amount of alimony payments to Joan and established
a death provision which was tied to the alimony obligation.
Joan clearly agreed to these terms. The chancellor erred in
allowing Joan to received a windfall. To find otherwise circumvents
the express language of the agreement. The chancellor was
correct in the determination that the insurance policy was
a separate contract, but the lower court inadvertently overlooked
the fact that Joan, as a party to the agreement, contracted
away her claim to receive more than the remaining $72,000.00
owed to her under the terms of the agreement.”
Day
v. Heller, 10 Neb. App. 886 (Nebraska Court of
Appeals, February 12, 2002): Robert E. Day, Jr., appealed
from an order of the district court for Sarpy County granting
summary judgment in favor of Robin E. Heller and dismissing
Robert’s petition. In Robert’s action against Robin,
he sought damages in tort for fraud, assumpsit, and emotional
distress upon discovering that he is not the biological father
of Adam, who was born during Robin and Robert’s marriage.
The district court granted summary judgment on the basis that
Robin was entitled to a judgment on the merits and on a finding
of paternity in Robert and Robin’s earlier dissolution
proceeding which acted as res judicata and barred Robert’s
current causes of action. The court of appeals found that
Robert’s causes of action in tort were not barred by
the doctrine of res judicata, and found that summary judgment
was improper.
Jeffries
v. Moore, No. COA00-1292 (North Carolina Court
of Appeals, February 5, 2002): A third party sought to establish
the paternity of a child born to a woman in an intact marriage.
The court held that Johnson v. Johnson, 120 N.C.
App. 1, 461 S.E.2d 369 (1995), rev’d by, 343
N.C. 114, 468 S.E.2d 59 (1996) (per curiam) does not prohibit
an alleged parent from challenging the presumption of legitimacy
which attaches when a child is born during a marriage union.
In
re Marriage of Medill, No. A112620 (Oregon Court
of Appeals, February 20, 2002): Father and mother met and
married in Denmark while father was serving in the military
in Germany. The parties had two children. Father the moved
to Oregon, while mother and children stayed in Germany. The
parties agreed that father would file for divorce in Oregon.
The 1998 dissolution judgment included parenting time and
joint custody provisions. Father then went back to court for
modification and contempt. In 1999, mother initiated custody
proceedings in Germany. The Oregon court dismissed father’s
modification action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under the UCCJEA.
Diamond
v. Diamond, No. 2002 PA Super 34 (Pennsylvania
Superior Court, February 13, 2002): An attorney representing
the wife in a divorce case lost the husband’s financial
records produced in discovery. She was then held in contempt
for failing to comply with an order to pay the bank for copies
of the lost originals. The attorney appealed. The appellate
court held that the court did not abuse its discretion in
finding the attorney in contempt and ordering her to pay the
husband’s costs of seeking compliance with order.
Mays
v. Mays, No. W2000-03067-COA-R3-CV (Tennessee
Court of Appeals, February 5, 2002): The husband appealed
the property division, denial of rehabilitative alimony, award
of attorney’s fees to wife, and decision not to hear
evidence on child custody. The court held that when the husband
deposited inherited funds into a marital bank account and
then used the bank account for marital purposes, the separate
funds transmuted into marital property. The husband also argued
that he suffered from depression, which limited his earning
capacity, and he was thus entitled to rehabilitative alimony.
The court found the husband able to work, and thus without
need of rehabilitative alimony. (Interestingly, the husband
also claimed he should have been awarded custody, because
although he suffered from depression and couldn’t work,
he was able to care for the children.)
Periodicals
Family Law Journals and Symposia
of Interest
Brigham Young University Law Review, Volume
2001, Number 3
“Symposium on the ALI Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution”
Francis J. Catania, Jr., Learning from the Process
of Decision: The Parenting Plan, page 857
Craig W. Dallon, The Likely Impact of the ALI Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution on Property Division,
page 891
James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field Theory
of the Family: The American Law Institute's Principles of
the Law of Family Dissolution, page 923
William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the
United States: A Review and Critique, page 961
F. Carolyn Graglia, A Nonfeminist’s Perspectives
of Mothers and Homemakers Under Chapter 2 of the ALI Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution, page 993
Lino A. Graglia, Single-Sex “Marriage”:
The Role of the Courts, page 1013
Terry S. Kogan, Competing Approaches to Same-Sex Versus
Opposite-Sex, Unmarried Couples in Domestic Partnership
Laws and Ordinances, page 1023
Gregory A. Loken, The New “Extended Family”
— “De Facto” Parenthood and Standing Under
Chapter 2, page 1045
David D. Meyer, What Constitutional Law Can Learn
from the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution, page
1075
Janet Leach Richards, Resolving Relocation Issues
Pursuant to the ALI Family Dissolution Principles: Are Children
Better Protected?, page 1105
Mark Strasser, A Small Step Forward: The ALI Domestic
Partners Recommendation, page 1135
David M. Wagner, Balancing “Parents Are”
and “Parents Do” in the Supreme Court’s Constitutionalized
Family Law: Some Implications for the ALI Proposals on De
Facto Parenthood, page 1175
Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique
of the American Law Institute’s “Domestic Partners”
Proposal, page 1189
Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and Importing Domestic
Partnerships: Some Conflict-of-Laws Questions and Concerns,
page 1235
Articles (alphabetical by author)
Marianne Brower Blair, The Impact of Family Paradigms,
Domestic Constitutions, and International Conventions on Disclosure
of an Adopted Person’s Identities and Heritage: A Comparative
Examination, 4 Michigan Journal of International
Law 587 (2001)
Pamela Gatos, Third Parent Adoption in Lesbian and Gay
Families, 26 Vermont Law Review 195
(2001)
Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History
of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 Georgetown
Law Journal 299 (2002)
Steven R. Hellman, Stepparent Custody upon the Death
of the Custodial Parent, 14 Journal of the Suffolk
Academy of Law 23 (2000)
Tori R. A. Kricken, Child Support and Social Security
Dependent Benefits: A Comprehensive Analysis and Proposal
for Wyoming, 2 Wyoming Law Review 39
(2002)
Judith G. McMullen, The Professional Athlete: Issues
in Child Support, 12 Marquette Sports Law Journal
411 (2001)
Joan Shufro, Should These Marriages Have Been Saved?:
Extreme Cruelty as a Cause of Action for Divorce in New Jersey
1950 — 1970, 23 Women's Rights Law Reporter
79 (2001)
And to answer the question why you should care about these
articles at all:
Thomas L. Fowler, Law Reviews and Their Relevance to
Modern Legal Problems, 24 Campbell Law Review
47 (2001)
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